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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(1) provides that an appellee brief may include a statement of
issues, consistent with the requirements of Rule 24(a), where "the appellee is dissatisfied
with the statement of the appellant[.]" In their Brief filed in this appeal, Appellees have
listed eight issues, apparently in reliance on Rule 24(b)(1). Upon examination, however,
most of Appellees' identified issues are duplicative, misstated, or are without basis.
Appellees' Issues 2,3, 6 and 8 merely restate issues already identified in Appellants'
statement of issues, and even include the same legal authorities for the respective standards
of review. Issues 1, 4 and 5 were not a basis for the summary judgment from which the
appeal is being taken and were not ruled upon by the district court. As such, it is
questionable whether the issue of privilege is properly before this Court on appeal. The only
new issue that Appellees raise legitimately is Issue 7 and even then, it is but a variation of
O'Connor's Issue No. 4.
RESPONSE TO APPELLEES9 STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Parents present their Statement of Facts in an argumentative narrative similar to
what would be argued in front of a jury. Nowhere do they attempt to distinguish whether
their claimed facts are undisputed and were before the trial court in proper form.] Even the
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A comparison of the fact section of the Memorandum in Support of Parent Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment with the Statement of Facts in the Parents Brieffiledwith this Court
shows no cogent relationship. Whereas pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 7, the fact section
of the Memorandum before the trial court was stated in numbered sentences, the Parents' Brief
before this Court is unnumbered and in narrative form. Nor is there any effort to tie by reference the
facts in the Brief to the facts in the Parents' Memorandum in Support of their Motion.
1

Parents' headings are phrased in argumentative form. Such a presentation of the Parents'
version of the facts is inappropriate for an appeal of a case decided on summary judgment,
where the facts and any reasonable inferences should be construed in Appellant O'Connor's
favor. In any case, O'Connor's Memorandum submitted to the trial court refutes the bulk
of the Parents' Statement of Facts. Therefore, except to sense the Parents' view of the case,
this Court can ignore the Parents' Statement of Facts for purposes of determining whether
summary judgment by the district court was appropriate.
Nevertheless, to show how the Parents' have generally skewed the facts, two
examples are in order. First, one of the repeated accusations made by the Parents at issue in
this litigation is that O'Connor was verbally abusive toward the girls on the basketball team.
To attempt to establish that their claim is true, the Parents selectively quote testimony to give
the impression that O'Connor regularly "screamed" at the girls on his team. (Appellees'
Brief at pp. 5-7.) However, they have "cherry-picked" the statements and have omitted the
proper contextual testimony. The following examples put the statements in context:
Q.

Did you scream and rave at the girls?

A.

I yelled as, like I said earlier last time, like any other coach.

Q.

So what's your objection to that, that they exempt Michelle out?

A.

Well, they - each girl was given constructive criticism, direction all the
same, everyone. Our general practice as a staff was every time we
corrected someone, there was praise with it. And that's what we - our
whole staff did that.
* * *
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So you don't have a problem with the word scream then?
Well, in the context of scream and rave, I have a problem with that.
Because to me, that seems to be overboard.
What's your definition of scream?
Right in their face.
You've never done that?
From the top of their lungs. No.
What's your definition of rave?
I guess to me, out of control.
And you've never been out of control with the team?
No.
And you don't believe that anyone watching you could have got that
opinion from your behavior; is that right?
I don't. I didn't have anyone approach me or come talk to me.

Oh, no parent has ever approached you after seeing you scream and yell
at their kids during a game No.
During practice?
Maybe what their daughter told them, yes.
So, you're telling us that it's - we have to distinguish between what
their daughter told them and what they personally observed on the
court?
3

A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay. So you deny that any parent ever went to you after seeing you
scream and yell at their daughters during a game and expressed concern
that you would treat them that way?

A.

That's correct.

(R. at 813-814.)
Q.

Had you screamed at her?

A.

Have I yelled at her? As a coach yells at players, yeah.

Q.

And is it possible that someone might view that as abusive on your
part?

MR. RUST: Objection, speculative and lack of foundation.
A.

I don't think a coach yelling at a player is abusive.

Q.

Can it be abusive?

A.

If they cross the line. And I didn't cross the line.

(R. at 812.)
Likewise, the Parents have selected one letter which they claim is representative of
all of the letters at issue in this case. That letter signed by Ruby Ray, a grandmother of one
of the girls on the team, is probably the mildest of all the letters in terms of its tone and
content of accusation. Even though O'Connor has identified many other letters alleging
discrimination and favoritism, verbal, emotional and psychological abuse of minor girls,
intimidating, threatening and humiliating behavior, team recruiting violations or
improprieties, outrageous public behavior,

unethical or illegal behavior, financial

improprieties, professional incompetence, inappropriate relationship with or unseemly
domination by Michelle Harrison's family, or future reprisals against particular girls on the
team due to the complaints registered by those girls' parents (see, e.g., R. at 1195-1198), the
Parents do not even address those letters.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
O'Connor takes exception to Parents' lengthy narration of facts. The narrative is not
in proper form and in any case the alleged facts are disputed. Despite a few cases from other
jurisdictions which take a contrary position, the better reasoned position, logically and for
policy reasons, is that high school teachers, including coaches, should not be considered
public officials for the purposes of defamation claims, with the possible exception where, in
addition to their teaching and coaching responsibilities, they have significant administrative
responsibilities. In any case, O'Connor did not become a public official for the purpose of
defamation claims by reason of his coaching the girls high school basketball team. The
Parents' comments, taken individually or more importantly in the context of being submitted
collectively, are capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. The standards and definitions
of malice vary, depending on the status of the person who is the subject of the defamation.
In any case, O'Connor has established colorable evidence of malice under any and all
standards. The Parents do not enjoy either an absolute or a qualified privilege. The
Memorandum of Costs issue is properly before this Court and the Parents failed to timely file
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their Memorandum of Costs. The case should be remanded to the trial court for a trial on
the merits.
ARGUMENT
This is not a case requiring marshaling of evidence. While reviewing the record in
front of it, the district court did not engage in a factfinding exercise, but only attempted to
determine whether the material submitted would sustain conclusions of law about: (1) the
presence of "public official" status, and (2) the presence or absence of malice. For the
purpose of an appeal of summary judgment, the evidence, facts and inferences must be
reviewed in a light most favorable to O'Connor as the non-movant. Surety Underwriters v.
E&C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71, ^ 15, 10 P.3d 338 (facts and inferences viewed in favor
of non-moving party); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991) (facts and
inferences viewed in favor of losing party). In the context of a defamation case, the appellant
court accepts as true the Plaintiffs contention that the defamatory statements were false, and
looks to whether the statements were capable of a defamatory meaning and whether any
privileges apply. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994).
I.

THE STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A
DEFAMATORY MEANING AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The trial court did not make any finding or determination whether the statements at

issue were capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. It solely found that O'Connor was
a "public official" and as such, that the statements were not made with the requisite degree
of malice. However, a determination of whether a statement can sustain a defamatory
6

meaning is necessarily preliminary to issues of public official status and malice. By moving
on to the public official and malice issues, and deciding the case on those bases, the district
court tacitly acknowledged that the statements on their face were capable of sustaining a
defamatory meaning.
In order to determine whether a given statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory
meaning, the statement or publication containing the statement must be viewed in its
particular context. A court "cannot determine whether a statement is capable of sustaining
a defamatory meaning by viewing individual words in isolation; rather, it must carefully
examine the context in which the statement was made, giving the words their most common
and accepted meaning." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999,1008-09 (Utah 1994)
(in reversing the Court of Appeals, noting that Court of Appeals erred in using a
"lexicographical approach" that "ignores context"). See also Mast v. Oversow 971 P.2d 928,
932 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[i]n deciding whether a statement is capable of sustaining a
defamatory meaning, the guiding principle is the statement's tendency to injure in the eyes
of its audience when viewed in the context in which it was made") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). "The relevant audience is neither an individual with peculiar
views, nor a majority of society at large, but rather a 'substantial and respectable minority.'"
14, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 cmt. e (1972).
The relevant context in this case is the total and cumulative effect of the numerous
letters and statements published by the Parents in conjunction with each other. A defamation
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case typically involves a single or a few statements by one individual which become the
subject matter of the subsequent defamation claim. Under those circumstances, it is easier
to focus on the lexicographical import of the statement. In this case, most (if not all) of the
letters and uttered statements in and of themselves contain defamatory material. In addition
to the defamatory nature of each letter and statement, these were combined by the Parents for
presentation to the public, thus lending further defamatory meaning by their sheer volume
and cumulative effect. In short, the defamation consists not only of each of the individual
defamatory statements at issue but also of the combining of the same as coordinated between
the Parents. In the mind of Donna Barnes, a member of the Alpine District Board and the
person who received the package of the Parents' letters, the multitude of charges made her
believe the charges were true and O'Connor should not even be teaching school. (R. at 1150,
1237, 1233-1234.)
The district court had before it all of the letters written by the Parents as well as the
minutes of meetings where oral statements were made. If the district court had determined
that the letters and statements could not sustain a defamatory meaning, it could easily have
disposed of this case on that basis, before ever reaching the issues of "public official" status
or the presence or absence of requisite malice. As noted above, the trial court tacitly
acknowledged that the oral statements and the letters could sustain a defamatory meaning.
All of those materials are part of the record on review, and are before this Court.

8

As noted above, in his Statement of Additional Material Facts submitted to the trial
court, O'Connor identified the different types of defamatory publications and specific letters
representative of those different areas of defamatory content. (R. at 1194-1195, 1198.) In
addition, in his deposition, O'Connor was asked concerning every letter and statements. (R.
at 1196.) The Ruby Ray letter was placed in tandem with a multitude of coordinated
defamatory statements and even repeated language from some of the other letters verbatim.
In that sense, and in viewing the letters in context, the Ruby Ray letter is a further affirmation
of all the other coordinated letters that were more or less simultaneously published for the
purpose of removing O'Connor from his coaching position.
To attempt to break out specific phrases within each individual letter and to assign
defamatory meaning to each parsed phrase in isolation, is to ignore context and the
cumulative impact the letters and comments had as an whole. To do so would be to wrongly
focus on a type of'lexicographical approach" that this Court has expressly rejected. West,
872P.2datl009.
It is important to note that the law does not require a phrase-by-phrase parsing or
dissecting approach to defamatory publications. Even the Parents' cited authority (Doggett
v. Regents of Univ. of California, 2003 WL 21666102, an unreported California case)
requires only that defamatory publications be identified with some specificity and not as
undifferentiated generalities. The Doggett case was decided on the basis that the plaintiff
in that case failed "to identify any defamatory statement attributable to any individual
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defendant" or that the statements were even defamatory. Id at ^ 2. In this case, the Court has
before it the actual statements and their authors as well as a breakout by types of statements
made. This is not a "dumping" of O'Connor's burden of argument and research onto the
Court, as erroneously alleged by the Parents. The fact that the defamatory material is so
voluminous is because the Parents purposefully produced it in significant volume.
In short, the materials submitted to the Court as part of the Record identified every
statement by author. There is nothing vague or uncertain about what each Parent is being
charged with publishing nor are such statements "shrouded in mystery": they are part of the
Record. Moreover, as noted above, O'Connor was questioned for 135 pages of his
deposition concerning each letter individually and he identified the untruths and defamatory
comments contained in each.
It is also important to note that "opinion" is not at issue here. "Under Utah law, a
statement is defamatory if it impeaches an individual's honesty, integrity, virtue, or
reputation and thereby exposes the individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." West,
872 P.2d at 1008. By any definition, accusations of financial impropriety, abuse of young
girls, discrimination, retaliation, recruiting and the like are statements tending to impeach an
individual's honesty, integrity and reputation. Moreover, the accusations were not given as
opinion but as fact. A few examples will suffice: "Over the past two years I have observed
the abusive treatment meted out to the girls [on the] team." (R. at p. 771.) "I have never
seen a coach attack kids like this." (Record at p. 771.) "This pattern of psychological abuse
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is degrading..." (Record at p. 770.) As a further example, Appellee Sue Chandler, a social
worker, stated that in her professional opinion O'Connor was abusive of the girls. (See, e.g.,
R. at 715, 763.) Furthermore, the fact that the Parents went to the trouble to publish such
accusations in a public and coordinated fashion indicates that they intended such accusations
to be understood as factual by their recipients, and not merely as an expression of opinion.
The letters on their face state the accusations about O'Connor as facts and actions that had
actually occurred. If one were to accept the Parents' proposed standard, any statement is
merely an opinion, and thus no statement is defamatory.
It must also be remembered that whether the statements were expressions of
"verifiable fact" is a matter for a factfinder, not for summary judgment by the court and all
facts and inferences in this case must be construed in O'Connor's and not the Parents' favor.
For the purposes of summary judgment, this Court has already stated the standard: where it
is undisputed that the defendants published the statements at issue and that such statements
were concerning the plaintiff, then the court must accept as true the plaintiffs "allegations
that the statements are false and their publication resulted in damage." West, 872 P.2d at
1008. The court looks only to whether the statements, assuming for purposes of summary
judgment that they are false, are capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. IdL
II.

O'CONNOR IS NOT A PUBLIC OFFICIAL,
Utah law requires a public official to be someone who invites public scrutiny. Russell

v. Thompson Newspapers. Inc., 842 P.2d.896, 903 (Utah 1992). The Parents state without

11

citation to the Record that "the undisputed evidence shows that O'Connor occupied a
position that invited public scrutiny[.]" (Appellees' Brief at p. 26.) Nowhere do the Parents
identify the nature of such "undisputed evidence." To the contrary, the Record supports the
conclusion that the scrutiny attaching to O'Connor's coaching position came not from the
general public but rather from the Parents and perhaps other members of their families.
The United States Supreme Court, while generally defining the parameters of a
"public official," has "expressly refrained from determining how comprehensive the term
'public official' should be. Van Dvke v. KUTV. 663 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1983). The U.S.
Supreme Court has only been willing to enunciate general guidelines. Id As such, the
determination of how comprehensively the concept of "public official" should be defined has
been left to the individual States. The fact that the several States have come to diametrically
different outcomes on this issue while relying on the same U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
and general guidelines is due to the fact that the different jurisdictions have given different
weight to the competing interests of freedom of expression and integrity of one's reputation.
See Franklin v. Lodge 1108. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks. 97 Cal.App.3d 915,924
(Cal. Ct.App. 1979).
In this case, varying policy arguments from different jurisdictions have been quoted
in support of the opposing positions as to whether or not teachers and high school staff
should be considered "public officials" for the purpose of defamation claims. As previously
outlined in O'Connor's Brief at pp. 28-29, the better reasoned position is the one articulated
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by a good number of bellwether jurisdictions which have declined to extend public official
status to teachers and school staff. Most of those jurisdictions base their policy and rulings
in significant part on the fact that teachers have little to no sway or influence on
administration or policymaking. Ironically, the Parents would extend "public official" status
to a high school teacher/coach whose decisionmaking ability over even the composition of
his team was challenged by them. (See, e.g., R. at 739, 1251-1252.) The Parents are in
effect arguing for a standard where any public employee is a public official, a drastic and farreaching standard already rejected by this Court. See Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah
1988).2
The Parents tried to elevate the status of O'Connor by noting that he was the head
coach of the girl's basketball team. In support they cite the Texas case of Johnson v.
Southwestern Newspapers Corp., 855 S.W. 2d 182 (Tex Ct. App. 1993). In that case
Plaintiff was the athletic director for the school as well as the head football coach. Aside
from the fact that Johnson is not a Utah case, it is submitted that a person who has the
responsibility for all athletics for the school has a far different and far more reaching
responsibility than the coach of the high school girl's basketball team. Indeed, the Johnson
case was quick to note that a school teacher is not a public official. Contrary to Appellee's
2

The Parents' citation oflnreK.B., 326 P.2d 395,396 (Utah 1958) for the proposition
that "the welfare, training and education of children are of such vital importance as to be a matter
of public concern" (Appellees' Brief at p. 27) is taken out of context. At issue in that case was the
State's power to deprive a biological parent of custody rights of a child on the basis of parental
neglect. As such, the "public concern" comment related to society's interest in a parent's duty
toward his or her own children rather than a public school teacher's duty.
13

Brief at pp. 29-31, it is further submitted that there is no evidence O'Connor had direct
responsibility for the budget of the girl's basketball program or "authority over a substantial
budget." Nor is there any evidence that the modest fund raising by the team amounted to
"thousands of dollars." There is no citation whatsoever to the Record for such claims. In
any case, the kinds of things which are being ascribed to O'Connor are the same things which
would apply, for example, to a high school debate coach or a drama teacher. They have the
right to determine who will be on the team or in the play They oversee team travel and the
acquisition of costumes and scenery. They will often have assistants. The list goes on
through the science club, the French club, the track team, and the Softball team. It is
submitted that the public at large takes far more interest in high school football games or in
boy's basketball games than they do in the girl's basketball games. Indeed, a high school
play will probably draw many more attendees from the community than a high school girl's
basketball game.

If the Parents' theory is correct, then anyone who is involved in extra-

curricular activities at school in any supervisory capacity whatsoever is a public official.
It was the Parents' purpose to do what they could to curtail the limelight on Michelle
Harrison. Some of their most repeated accusations are that O'Connor gave undue preference
to Michelle Harrison and treated her too much like a star when he should have been treating
all the girls equally. The Parents now turn that rallying cry on its head by claiming that
because O'Connor had an exceptional player, he somehow gained public official status
because of her stature. Aside from the fact that this is more of a "public person" than a

14

"public official" argument, it does not follow from any of the case law that having a star on
a basketball team is equal to the life and death power vested in a policeman. Ironically, Gary
Burningham and Sue Chandler had far more authority over the team than did O'Connor by
reason of their getting an agreement from the principal that neither of their daughters would
be cut from the team and would see substantial playing time. (R. at 739, 1251.) That may
have come by reason of their influence in the community of Lehi or simply because of their
influence over the principal, but obviously it was more substantial than O'Connor's
influence.
III.

THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF
MALICE.
At pages 29-37 of his Appellant Brief, O'Connor has already addressed at great length

the issue of malice and its different forms and standards. There is no need to repeat that
analysis. However, as noted previously, the question of "actual malice" is a constitutional
fact which this Court will review by way of an independent examination of the Record,
giving no deference to the district court's findings or conclusions. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005
UT 81, ffl| 91, 94, 103 P.3d 325. "Statements of actual malice are those made with
knowledge that they were false or made with reckless disregard of whether they were false
or not." IcL at Tl 119. As also previously noted, the standard for "reckless disregard" is that
the publisher "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication" and evidence
supporting a conclusion that the publisher "had a high degree or awareness of probable
falsity." (Appellent's Brief, p. 30; Appellee's Brief, p. 34.)
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The Parents argue that the "reckless disregard" standard is inapplicable to them
because of their studied ignorance or refusal to "probe" into the truth of their allegations.
The Parents then selectively cite portions of the Record to give the impression that the
principal and school administration had not in fact come to any conclusions about the
allegations regarding O'Connor. To the contrary, the Parents exhibited a high degree or
awareness of the probable falsity of their claims by their continued repeating the same claims
despite investigation into them by school administration and the administration conclusion
that there were not grounds for the allegations of either financial improprieties or abuse of
team members. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 33-37.) This scienter or "reckless disregard" is
further confirmed by the fact that the July allegations, which were the same as raised in
March and April, were not taken back to the high school administration, as the Parents had
been instructed, but rather were taken to a new and fully public forum, namely the School
Board open meeting, at a time when the basketball season was long over and the school year
had concluded. In other words, the accusations were not based on any new conduct that had
occurred since the administration's investigation, were entirely gratuitous, and were made
in bad faith. Actual malice, either in the form of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of truth is readily apparent or inferable from such actions. The coordinated letter-writing
campaign utilizing similar themes and language is also indicative of such scienter. As a side
note, the Parents' argument further reveals the need, assuming that the actual malice standard
is to be applied in this case, for a factual presentation to a fact finder.
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The Parents cite the case of Sewell v. Brockbank. 581 P.2d 267 (Ariz. Ct.App. 1978),
for the proposition that parents taking their complaints about a teacher to another
administrative level despite that teacher's denials of the complaint is not sufficient evidence
of "actual malice." It should be noted that Sewell does not set out a general rule governing
parent-teacher interactions. At best, whether the evidence can sustain sufficient evidence of
malice to take the question to a jury is a case-by-case inquiry. As such, the facts of Sewell,
which is not binding authority in any event, are distinguishable from the facts of this case.
In Sewell. parents of students of a particular chemistry teacher composed a list of grievances
dealing with the teacher's teaching style and methodology and presented it to the principal.
The teacher denied the charges in writing, and the principal expressed his confidence in the
teacher. The parents then took their complaint to the school district superintendent. Upon
receiving no response from him, the parents finally took their complaint to a school board
meeting. In this case, O'Connor teaching was not at issue. Further, the Parents received a
letter on April 15, 2004 explaining the principal's position. No effort was made to take the
matter to the superintendent. Rather, some three months later letters were submitted to a
member of the School Board in her private capacity. Thereafter, and without being on the
Board's agenda and in a public as opposed to a confidential setting, the Parents made further
claims.
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IV,

THERE IS NO ABSOLUTE DEFAMATION PRIVILEGE AVAILABLE TO
THE PARENTS.
The Parents have no absolute defamation privilege. The cases cited by the Parents,

most of which are from other jurisdiction are inapposite to this case. The Parents either
individually or collectively, are not public officials. Their statements were not made in either
a judicial or legislative proceeding. While the School Board meeting may arguably be
characterized as an "official proceeding authorized by law," the Parents were not called on
or scheduled as witnesses or to testify in any capacity. Nor did the School Board take any
action as a result of their comments or letters. (R. at 1151.) As such, Appellants do not
qualify for an absolute immunity, and could only argue at best that they come under a
qualified immunity. However, as noted in O'Connor's initial brief at pp. 37-39, the
offending statements do not even qualify for a qualified immunity.
As noted in O'Conor's initial brief, Mortensen v. Life Ins. Corp., 315 P.2d 283 (Utah
1957) is inapposite to the Parents' argument inasmuch as the Alpine School Board did not
take any administrative action based on the Parents' defamatory comments. O'Connor was
given no notice of the meeting, the Parents' accusations against him were not an agenda item,
the Parents were not invited to the meeting as witnesses, nor were their comments invited or
solicited beforehand. In addition, O'Connor was not a subject of any proceedings or actions
taken by the Board that night. Rather, the Parents made a series of coordinated impromptu
statements during the public comment portion of the meeting. While the Board listened to
the Parents' comments, it declined to take any jurisdiction over or any action in regard to the
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matter, and referred the matter to the superintendent, who in turn referred it back to the high
school administration. The Board did not apply any law to facts, or otherwise exercise any
discretion in relation to either O'Connor or the Parents' comments. Mortensen, 315 P.2d at
284. There was no quasi-judicial proceeding at issue.
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-421(l)(a) (which is being raised and cited for the first time
on appeal) is clearly inapplicable. It relates to "civil actions" brought by or on behalf of a
student. The statute requires the aggrieved students to bring a written complaint to the local
board of education prior to bringing a civil action. Nowhere does it provide immunity for
defamation.

The Parents improperly try to shoehorn their letter-writing campaign as

somehow being done in compliance with this statute and therefore bringing such
communications within the ambit of an administrative proceeding. While creative in their
approach, the Parents' assertion is clearly at odds with the facts and the Record, and is clearly
an after-the-fact argument. The Parents nowhere suggest the possibility of a lawsuit or any
disciplinary action nor do they ask the Board for a hearing. The letters are simply gratuitous
and were never formally submitted to the School Board.

Further, the Parents never filed

a complaint within 60 days of filing their individual letters, as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 53A-3-421(l)(a). The facts belie any argument that the Parents were acting in anticipation
of any remedy provided by Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-421(a).
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V.

THERE IS NO QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE AVAILABLE TO THE PARENTS.
O'Connor have previously surveyed Utah case law applying the "common interest"

privilege and shown how it is inapplicable to the facts of this case (Appellant Brief, pp. 3940). In response, the Parents do not address that case law, but rather look to other
jurisdictions' purported application of the doctrine. Aside from their lack of precedential
value, those cases are not applicable to the present situation. For example, Daubenmire v.
Sommers, 805 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio Ct. App.2004) was examined and distinguished in
O'Connor's initial brief and Sewell v. Brockbank is explained above. The case of Gatto v.
St. Richard School Inc. 774 N.E. 914 (Ind. App. 2002), was decided on the basis that there
was no defamation. In dictum, the court also held that there was a common interest privilege
in the private school notifying the parents that plaintiff had been terminated as a teacher. Id.
at 926. Under those circumstances the parents probably had a bona fide interest in knowing
that fact. In short, the cases cited by the Parents stand for the proposition that in certain
formal school investigations and actions, there are privileges of communication. The instant
case is not such a situation for the many reasons identified herein and in O'Connor's initial
brief. Moreover, to the extent there was any possible privilege, the Parents have abused the
same by their extensive publication of their defamatory material to the public at large.
VI.

THE PARENTS5 MEMORANDUM OF COSTS WAS UNTIMELY.
At the outset, the Parents have challenged this Court's jurisdiction over the issue of

costs. Prior to the recent amendment of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
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this Court issued several opinions which dealt with the issue of post-judgment rulings on
attorneys fees. In the recent case of ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile. 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254,
this Court clarified the fact that post-judgment rulings on attorneys fees were significant parts
of the case and in many instances could make the difference to whether a party chose to
appeal or not. On the other hand, rulings on costs are to be considered to be not a material
matter and thus "such entry is merely a nunc pro tunc entry which relates back to the time the
original judgment was entered, and does not enlarge the time for appeal.. ." Id. at ^f 11. In
this case both the noticed appeal and the docketing statement had been filed before the trial
court even ruled on the issue of costs. It is not in the interest of judicial economy or the
proper flow of matters for an amended notice of appeal to be filed to simply add the issue of
costs, particularly when, as noted, costs are considered an incidental matter to the case.
Moreover, the docketing statement

raised this matter specifically by the language:

"Appellees also filed a Memorandum of Costs to which Appellant has made objection."
(Docketing Statement ^ 4.)
As to the merits of O'Connor's objection to the costs, the relevant sequence of filings
was as follows. On November 30, 2005, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision
granting summary judgment in favor of the Parents. On January 10, 2006, the Parents filed
a Motion for Attorneys Fees. The Parents did not move for costs at the same time, unlike
most prevailing parties that typically make both requests at the same time. The Order of
Summary Judgment, prepared and submitted by O'Connor after the Parents failed to do so,
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was entered on January 11, 2006. (R. at 1366.) The Order was a final order on all issues
raised in litigation, and was not a partial adjudication as to less than all of the issues or the
parties that would have required Rule 54(b) certification. O'Connor filed his appeal on
January 17, 2006. The Parents submitted their Memorandum of Costs on January 19, 2006.
That Memorandum of Costs was contested and the trial court's ruling came on February 14,
2006. (R. at 1560.)
All parties concede that the deadline for filing the Memorandum of Costs was January
19, 2006. It is also undisputed that the document was not actually filed with the district
court until January 20, 2006. Appellees argue that for purposes of "filing," the date of
mailing rather than the actual date of filing should be considered. Appellees have cited no
persuasive legal authority for this proposition, but have urged this Court to adopt a good-faith
based on a dissenting opinion. O'Connor submits that the law is clear enough on this issue
without this Court having to construct a new mailing rule. First, the law is clear that the fiveday limitation on filing a memorandum of costs is strictly construed, Highland Constr. Co.
v. Union Pac. R.R.. 683 P.2d 1042, 1052 (Utah 1982), and that memoranda failing to meet
this timing requirement are excluded, Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d305,318(Utah 1998).
Second, the Rule on its face is clear and unambiguous in its requirement that the applicant
"file with the court" the memorandum of costs within five days ofjudgment. In constructing
a rule or statute, an appellate court looks first to the plain language of the rule or statute, and
only looks further in the case of an ambiguity. MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2006
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UT 18, Tf 12, 134 P.3d 1116. "[Statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused or inoperable." State v. Bluff. 2002 UT 66, ^ 34, 52 P.3d 1210.
"Unless so specified, the words of a statute are given their ordinary meanings and not their
possible legal or technical meanings." State ex rel. A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1101 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).
Here, "filing" clearly means filing with the Court, and not the date of mailing. There
is nothing clear or ambiguous about the meaning of filing. The Court should reject the
Parents' suggestion that "filing" be given an extra legal or technical meaning of "mailing"
that is not obvious or ascertainable from the face of the Rule itself. This Court has stated that
it "will not infer substantive provisions into a statute that are not expressly contained
therein." Bradley v. Pavson Citv Corp., 2003 UT 16, ^ 35, 70 P.3d 47. Because the Parents'
Memorandum of Costs was not filed with the district court until six days after the entry of
judgment, it should have been excluded from judgment, and the district court erred in
refusing to do so.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, together with those previously adduced in O'Connor's
initial Brief, this Court should reverse and vacate the district court's summary judgment, and
instruct the district court to proceed with the case to a trial of this matter.
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